Genetic screening 1
Dr Philip Evans described genetic screening as a relatively novel practice, although it had been hinted at by Francis Galton in 1908 when he wrote: 'I conceive it to fall within man's province to replace natural selection by other processes that are more merciful and not less effective'.
Professor Paul Polani gave a clear account of the techniques, notably amniocentesis, available for prenatal screening for defect. He said that amniocentesis at 16-IR weeks of pregnancy. and study of the amniotic fluid and cells allow the prenatal recognition of four categories of genetic and related fetal abnormalities: chromosome anomalies, X-linked diseases, neural tube defects and specific biochemical errors. Most of the lastnamed arc autosomal recessives. but some are Xlinked. Prenatal diagnosis may be indicated as part of genetic counselling, when the risk of a specific and recognizable fetal abnormality is excessive or when population screening has identified a group of pregnancies at high risk of one of these fetal anomalies. He also discussed counselling aspects, the laboratory techniques in use and the results of the prenatal diagnostic work of the South East Thames Regional Genetic Centre in the Paediatric Research Unit at Guy's Hospital.
Dr Philip Evans explained the moral aspects a little further. asking very pertinent questions quoting from the Johns Hopkins Magazine from the USA: Who shall live? Who shall be aborted? Who shall reproduce? Who shall decide? And, very importantly: How defective is too defective? He went on to consider aspects of screening techniques and the information they provide, starting with the reasons for which the investigations are made.
Dr Evans said that before proposing a survey we should ask what can be done as a result of finding an abnormality. A patient with the common type of muscular dystrophy may have a baby brother with no sign of disease but who may be developing it, and this can be found out by a chemical test; but the early diagnosis makes no difference to treatment or prevention it merely bnngs the parents' misery on a couple of years early. The beneficiary may be the patient. if to detect an abnormality I Report of a meetingof the Open Section, 7 March 1977 0141-076Rj7H/lIOR49-03jSOI.OOjO means that it can be treated with a fair chance of success. This is obvious in the case of congenital dislocation of the hip. or in cretinism where thyroid hormones are required.
Dr Evans pointed out that the beneficiary may be the community. but that there may be ethical difficulty in weighing general good against individual diagnosis and possible stigmatization. However, help for the individual with phenylketonuria is also help for the community, whjch will not have to support a severely handicapped patient.
Finally, screening may benefit the investigator or his associates. This may be little more than scientific curiosity and so it must not involve risk or inconvenience to the person being screened. When the blood or urine is being examined for ordinary reasons. there is no harm in doing other tests on the same specimens provided that one is prepared to face the consequences. The question is: what does one do about a positive result? Ought one to tell an unsuspecting youth, who did not know he was being tested, that he has been found to be a carrier of a recessive gene for a lethal disease?
A paper by Mrs Shirley Levinson gave a personal account of the distress of parents who carry Tay-Sachs' disease, and made a strong appeal for greater use of prenatal diagnosis in order to avoid her experience of giving birth to an apparently normal child, only to nurse her until she died from the disease.
The lively discussion which followed the three papers was led by Dr Gerald Corney of the MRC Human Biochemical Genetic Unit of University College. London. Particularly thoughtful contributions came from the many London medical students present.
Professor Gordon Dunstan, President of the Section. summed up the discussion with considerable elegance. He suggested that we might begin at the end and work back with the general wish to have a 'perfect' child. Then we would recognize that we cannot assure it; that we are learning rather more now about how to calculate the chances against it; and that what we have is a slowly increasing ability to eliminate the worst disappointments. We would recognize, secondly, that physical perfection is not the only desider-atum: partly because some physically 'perfect' people are very unhappy; partly because some physically handicapped people are not only very happy, but also have a capacity to create happiness in others. Therefore, the pursuit of physical perfection cannot be an absolute; there is no obligation to pursue it by all possible means; and we are left with choices -decisions to be made using such principles as proportionate good and proportionate harm.
This would lead us to consider the means by which we might promote the birth of congenitally sound babies and discourage the birth of severely handicapped babies. Selective mating, once the Galtonian dream, can be excluded for reasons scientific -because the human organism is too complex for us to be able to breed for single selected characteristics, as in plants and the lower animals, and genetic variety is essential for continued evolution; and for reasons moral-because a successful policy of selective mating would presuppose an imposed political tyranny which would prove odious.
Genetic counselling, before marriage or before conception (and before screening), is more acceptable: it is based on good science -the possibility, within limitations, of giving at least negative advice; and it matches good morals -because it can be sought and acted upon (or not) voluntarily, and it maximizes freedom of choice, of decision.
The third possibility is genetic screening and prenatal diagnosis, with all its limitations, including what is sometimes called 'reproductive compensation': the fact that the abortion of a defective fetus, followed by a new conception and the birth of a 'sound' baby, might well be adding another carrier of a defective gene to the general stock -a potential source of trouble in another generation. Insofar as this is an activity of medical science, it is subject to all the normal ethical criteria of medicine: e.g, considerations of the least drastic remedy; the probability of effectiveness; the balance of risk to the fetus and the mother involved in the operations, in relation to the risks attending the fetus and the mother if both were left undisturbed; and the proportion between the cost and effort ofa screeningcampaign and the good resulting from it.
Morally there are wider questions to be asked. They rest on the fact that, despite man's genetic and biochemical rooting in the non-animal world, and despite the necessity for a given biologically functioning physical basis for personality, the factors which determine what we actually characterize as 'human' and 'humanity' are not genetically carried. For example, courage, compassion, caring, concern for truth, discerning between good and bad and choosing accordingly -that is, the peculiarly human qualities -are functions not of genetic inheritance but of relationship, cultural inheritance.
The general test of a programme based on genetic screening, therefore, must be whether its pursuit would maximize these human but nongenetic factors, or whether it would subordinate them to the pursuit of a genetic 'perfection' which would be bound to elude us. Arnold & Moseley (1976) have pointed to the social dangers attending such a programme: the building up of social pressures to eliminate the potentially handicapped child; an induced guilt in the mother who happened to bear one; and a possible attitude of callousness towards it simply because it 'ought not to have been born'. And when voluntary screening passes into compulsory screening (whether the compulsion was legal or by means of concerted social or economic pressures), the spectre of Hitler's Aryan youth is recalled, in whose name untold crimes were committed against those who were unacceptably different.
These considerations are advanced not to condemn geneticscreening itself, but only to insist that a society which wishes to keep its values straight should not ignore them; it has to determine its goals and the means by which they are to be pursued.
As to abortion following upon an adverse prenatal diagnosis, the ethics can be disputed (Sellar 1976) . Clearly the practice could not be accommodated under the heading of justifiable feticide, by analogy with justifiable homicide. in which the fetus is killed as an aggressor against a vital interest of the mother, no less drastic remedy being available: the fetus is killed in this instance on the ground that it is in its own interest for it not to live with a gross handicap. A justification could be found where there was a positive diagnosis of a handicap so gross that if the child were born alive it would not be appropriate to intervene actively to prolong its life: it would seem morally odd to insist on bringing to term a child whom everyone concerned (while giving it due nursing care) hoped would die soon. Unfortunately, very few such handicaps can be diagnosed prenatally and the argument would seldom apply. The most that could be said is that responsible practitioners men whose ethical integrity in other respects is beyond question -would repudiate the logic of, for example, Paul Ramsey, that a willingness to kill a defective fetus in utero logically entails a willingness to kill a handicapped child born alive: 'they would prefer to be guided by such.illogical ethics than allow considerations of pure logic to alter their attitude to the two situations.' (Harris 1974) . There is a moral insight in ethics which compels, even when its logic is nof -elearly understood.
In conclusion, Professor Dunstan said that the terms which he had offered for consideration were aJl drawn from the Hippocratic tradition of medicine itself: he had not introduced specifically religious considerations at aJl. Yet he saw no essential contradiction between what he had said and what he might have said in the terms of Judaeo-Christian tradition. In that tradition bodily soundness, wholeness, was highly valued: soteria was used in New Testament Greek for the preservation of the body as well as for 'salvation'; sozeinwas used for 'to heal' as well as for 'to save'; Jesus healed men's bodies. But the very imperative in that tradition, to care for the sick and to help the helpless, was witness to the primacy of the ethics of relationship over the pursuit of physical perfection; and those ethics were raised to an absolute Letters to the Editor nHSSpolicy From Dr J W Paulley Ipswich IPI 3PJ Sir, Sir John Donne (July Journal, p 539) refers to old mental hospitals as 'inaccessible monstrosities', yet many people are learning that they are better ventilated and sound-proofed and, when suitably adapted, are more pleasant to live and work in than the crop of ticky-tacky boxes sown at district general hospitals in obedience to DHSS policy but yet to show any positive yield. Asylum too is once again being seen for some patients as preferable to the ever-rotating door. Of course, we need more halfway houses and sheltered workshops. Sir John asks me to define what essential services a district hospital should have. I would suggest that if local communities were once again entrusted with such decisions there would at least be a chance of some people getting things right. Instead, the whole country is at the mercy of omniscient planners prepared to experiment with its health; indeed, many of their newly-fledged chickens can be seen coming home to roost with monotonous regularity.
With regard to Sir John's last paragraph, the privately-dcclared intention of the bureaucrats has always been to exclude the public as far as possible from decision-making, and since 1974 they have virtually achieved this. Community health councils are allowed to comment only after decisions are made, not before. They are mostly ignored in any in the Christian understanding of the person and work of Jesus. He did no disservice, therefore, to the religious tradition in outlining a grammar of the ethics of screening as he had.
CLAIRE RAYNER
Section Editor, Open Section case. Advisory committees are treated in the same way; 'consultation' is a sick joke. District management teams take decisions and control funds of no less magnitude than did the old hospital management committees (HMCs) but without lay representation and beyond public scrutiny. The press is excluded. As a member of an area health authority representing the public I am expected in 2! hours once a month with 19 non-officer co-members to examine plans and current maintenance and organization presented to us by the officers and costing about £40 million per annum. Subcommittees, so valuable to the old HMCs, are now not allowed or are officially discouraged. In short, the NHS administrative structure since 1974is a disgrace and an insult to the public it claims to serve. Yours faithfully JWPAULLEY 8 August )978
Electroencephalography today From Dr S G Bayliss DepartmentofClinical Neurophysiology, Royal Surrey County Hospital, Guildford Dear Sir, Dr Critchley's editorial (July Journal, p 473) on the whole gives an admirable summary of the present position. There arc, however, two points on which I would disagree with him.
The first of these concerns the cost of an EEG. The figure of £6 is, I believe, based on the charge
